Saturday, February 9, 2013

Party for Conservers of Liberty

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I cannot be a Republican.  I cannot sign on to be a useful idiot for establishment Rinos.  I vote for them when they are the only viable lesser of weevils.  I want a viable Conservative Party.  I will support a Conservative Wing, and would send money to it even under the Republican umbrella --- were its finances kept under a separate lockbox.  However, I don't think the crony establishment really wants Conservatives under its wing.  It just wants their useful votes, so it can go on its merry swindling way.  The multi-headed, kubuki monster of McCain-Graham-Amnesty will never stop swindling cheap labor for crony corporatists.  They will not run out of money, because they can print it.  And they will not run out of fools, because they can import and breed them.  And you cannot compete with their securities swindles because they can tip crises to favor their hedges.  The game will continue to be rigged until there is an American Manifesto on the heels of an event that wakes up Americans.
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Wednesday, February 6, 2013

WILLFULLY IMAGINING AND PLAYING WITH TRIVIAL ASSUMPTIONS


WILLFULLY IMAGINING AND PLAYING WITH TRIVIAL ASSUMPTIONS:
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Have you ever repeated the idea that everything that is possible is in some world inevitable? When it comes to ontological world views, are you aware of any that are not based on tail-chasing assumptions? Some people take the view that we have no real capacity for making choices of will. To me, the absurdity seems to be that we have no choice not to effect choices of will. Is it possible not to implicate ontological assumptions? Is it possible to engage in pursuits or devote oneself to a worldview that is not tail-chasing? Doesn't the scientific process itself tend to abide in respect of an ontological assumption that "the truth is out there" (and that we can find it)?  When I think about materialism, I tend also to think of dialectical materialism (Marxism). Am I wrong that collectivist societies based mainly on political philosophies of materialism often find it easier to be indifferent to the elimination of millions in pursuit of ideals of materialistic perfectionism?
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. I don't expect that the First Cause should have need or means to refer to subordinate "causes" in order to prove the certitude of IT's causality. I expect Godel apprehended that. I suspect that's why Lewis staked more on "inside knowledge than on empirical proof. But what is this "inside" knowledge inside of? I suspect it is "inside" an illusion. Free will and soul are not demonstrable inside a body or material brain because the measurements of such materials are artifactual of the rules and math that have been laid down to present and conserve the universe that avails our communications. However, that does not implicate that a Reconciler of perspectives of Will is irrelevant to purposeful choice making among presentations of possible alternatives. I think religions, beliefs, and philosophies that reduce a Guidng Reconcer to moral irrelevancy tend more readily to substitute loyalty and worship for an inhuman, collectivist concept over individuals. I doubt you find many societies that promote a general ideal of freedom for all individuals being carefree about slaughtering millions in order to entertain their dreams.
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If one assumes nothing is possible to manifest except that which manifests in this universe, then, to be consistent and coherent, one must assume there abides only this universe and that freedom of choice, true randomness, and self will are nothing but illusions.  Tautologically and trivially, if one could establish that a situation is not ever going to occur, then one could reasonably say that it is not possible for it to occur.  However, what mortal can "know" such a thing?  Thus, it seems incoherent to speak in terms that assume one can know, or even logically postulate, how to separate that which is possible from that which is impossible.  Why?  Because, in Will and Math, all that can be imaged (imagined) seems potentially possible, even though Will may "choose" never to make it manifest to any mortal perspective, beyond the imagination (and imaginary numbers) of the Holism.  Unless Will (beyond logic and science) has meta-capacity to affect "choices" from among that which is potential, in order to affect the determination of that which is made manifest, then it would not make consistent and coherent sense to refer to anything as being "possible" ... unless it were (in some world) inevitable.
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If one assumes that Will in all cases SHOULD be assumed to be mere illusion, then, by tautologically trivial definition, that which is assumed to be beyond potential of being signified or expressed into the manifest (or in-form-ed into the chronological vector) of any world may be assumed to be impossible to be signified or informed in any world.  More simply put, that which is impossible (assuming any thing is impossible) ... is impossible.  So then, does this sort of "imaginative assumptive-ness" mean that that which is possible must, in some time and place in some world, be made manifest?  Stated differently, does it implicate that that which is Not Impossible of being expressed or made Possible in every world must, at some loci of space-time in some world, be made manifest?  More simplistically put, must that which is possible be inevitable, at some locus of space-time?  Must all that is possible eventually, inevitably, find expression in some world (monkeys typing out the works of Shakespeare)?
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Such "reasoning" seems flawed.  Intuitively, not all that is possible is inevitable.  So, how may some foundational reasoning in physics be flawed?  What assumption do physicists often found their reasoning on, which may not quite be true?  Well, they tend to assume that conscious will is at every level inferior to physically measurable signification and manifestation.  However, what if all physically measurable significations are instead inferior to qualitatively interfunctioning sequences and iterations of a conscious, signifying, and reconciling Will?
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Hamlet:
And therefore as a stranger give it welcome.
There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,
Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.
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Monday, February 4, 2013

Stubborness of Illusions

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Consciousness seems to enjoy a property of singularity of focus, as well as of synchronicity among plural iterations and contexts. Surely, every cell in my body is replaced multiple times during my life, yet some aspect of my identity, my I-ness, remains the same. Consciousness may abide as a one of a kind, singular entity that is limited only by math in terms of its potential for iterating, subdividing, overlapping, and complicating in vectors and unfoldings of disorganizations of the manifest and reorganizations and renormalizations of the potential.
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A God who can will and image ITs-singular-self as variously organized perspectives and iterations of ITs-plural-self, among IT-self, would seem potent to renormalize just about anything that can be imagined in space-time. The challenging question is: What should we iterations of such reconciling Consciousness (God?) seek to coordinate as "NORMAL," as space-time unfolds? As Consciousness "grows," what should it (God?) seek to express, and how are we, bonded as we are to mere iterations and incomplete perspectives, to receive such instruction? What change-agents are attuned to sense, rather than merely rationalize, that metaphysic?
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I don't see how mere science, free of resort to inner intuition, could "answer" such a question. To answer such a question, it would seem that space-time should be an empirically testable thing-in-itself. However, I don't fathom how space-time could be such a thing, by itself. Physicists often consider time to be a stubborn illusion. Illusion of what? Of consciousness? If so, must not the entire web of space-time be illusion, derivative of Will of Consciousness? Even as Will deludes and vectors itself, to believe space-time abides as a real thing in itself, I doubt all of reality could be empirically measured or reduced to a coherent and consistent explanation under any such a belief or model. I don't see how mere practice of delusion could force a metaphysic to become merely empirical. I don't intuit that any theory of everything could ever explicate all that is possible to make apparently manifest in physics.
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