Sunday, July 2, 2017

Logic and Triviality

Basic courses in logic are fine, for going deep down the empirically quantitative rabbit hole.  But what about the subjectively qualitative rabbit hole?

1)  Is a statement of appreciation for beauty not a statement?  Must it be either true or false?  Or may it be conditionally true or false, depending on time, place, and observer?  As well as changes in the mood of the observer. 

There are many similar examples that seem often to trouble Progs operating under a little training in logic.  A random sample of similar statements may be:

Ambiguity is (or is not) your friend.
Faith-based systems of morality are (all) bad.
Rule under elites who rely only on science is the best form of government.
Profiling, intolerance, and inequality are always bad.
The moral best is the quickest, most painless and permanent release from pain.
The slippery slope is a fallacy.
Democracy is the best form of government.
It is true that I feel bad.  Except now I feel better.  Maybe.

Many qualitative statements concerning fleeting subjective feelings (about the truth of one's feelings, or judgments about goodness or beauty) are necessarily incomplete.  To suggest that a statement that a thing must be either true (or beautiful) in itself, or not, is not a statement that is amenable of an either/or kind of logic or math.

I do not say that ambiguity is my friend.  I say it can be my friend for some purposes in some contexts, but it may not be my friend in others.  Moreover, my original judgment about the truth of my feeling may be subject to change upon additional reflection.

2)  A like problem carries over even for things that we assume to be quantifiable.  This is because our models in respect of what we are measuring are often incomplete, uncertain, expanding, or changing.  Because no non-trivial model can support a complete explanation for everything, it may be that hidden, fluxing, or changing variables preclude a final judgment about the truth or falsity of important concerns (such as what is appropriate for human purposefulness) that remain beyond the trivial.  On that account, perhaps it would be folly for a citizenry of free thinkers to surrender their freedom to so-called elites of science and logic?

3) Moreover, how much can we trust our empiricism to so-called unchanging or objective laws of physics?

Do those laws flux and phase shift over time?  Upon active input by change agents?  How much of what we take to be laws of nature are renormalizations of appearance?

Does it make logical sense to believe there is really any such thing as a particle-in-itself?  Or a real point of origin of the so-called Big Bang?  Or a measurable end to our universe?  Or a present "now-ness" that applies throughout our physical universe?  Must every mortal at ever spatial locus in our measurable universe presently measure its age at some 13 billion years?

Is Information really always preserved, or is it simply renormalized to so appear to observers?  (If all representational record of a bit of Information truly were lost, how would any mortal mind know it?)

4)  Given concerns such as those listed above, it seems to me to be folly to expect that every purposeful judgment "should" be confined to some kind of incomplete or pc system of so-called true-false tests of logic.  Rather, I think human reason should also entail respect for that which seems to be self evident, intuitive, and/or empathetic.  That would be meant to restore the human factor into decisions that concern humanity.  Citizens of experience may want to consider, if they value a representative republic, what kind of fundamentals about faith, family, and fidelity are necessary or conducive to sustaining it?  That kind of question is not legitimately answerable by moral scientists or true-false logicians.

I wonder:  How many kids in college who learn about debate fallacies are also learning about the limits of logic and non-faith?


‽ Based on current trends among schools of thought, there is presently no consensus for a standard classification of maths --- except to suggest that any attempted model for classification of maths would be outside an accepted consensus regarding philosophy ‽


I understand that those who claim statements must be either true or false must be defining statements in a context that excludes broad moral statements. However, even then, I doubt they are as rigorously correct as they imagine. For a non-trivial statement to be true or false under an explanatory model, the model itself would generally need to be complete. However, most, if not all, non-trivial models are incomplete. That said, for many practical tinkerings, it works well to take some statements to be "true" and others to be "false."

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